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Minsung Kim

IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTH KOREAN PRODUCT LIABILITY
INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH KOREA
As South Korean Product Liability Act was revised to adopt the U.S. doctrine of
punitive damages, there is a theoretical necessity of reviewing the relations between the
theory of product liability and the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages. The theory of
product liability is closely related to the strict liability but the doctrine of punitive
damages has been developed to regulate malicious misconducts. Due to the different
basic concepts, the strict liability and malicious misconducts, the theory of product
liability might not include the doctrine of punitive damages. In addition to the
compatibility issue, functions of the punitive damages are another issue. Although the
punitive damages are regarded not as a criminal issue, but as torts, the punitive damages
function as punishment, deterrence, retribution, and so on. With the issues about
compatibility and functions, this thesis suggests two implications for improving the
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. The first implication for the revised South
Korean Product Liability Act is that implementing the punitive damages of South Korea
within the three times of compensatory damages regardless of the degree of malicious
misconducts is not fit for regulating various types of malicious misconducts. Therefore,
there is a necessity for reforming the three–time’s cap of South Korean punitive damages.
The second is that South Korean manufacturers have a responsibility to consider their
products’ safety.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
In the South Korean legal system, even though the U.S. doctrine of punitive

damages was enacted as a special rule in the several special acts,1 there was a dispute
over whether the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages could be introduced into South
Korean Product Liability Act.2 After policymakers of South Korea considered the U.S.
doctrine and its pros and cons, the doctrine was introduced into the revised South Korean
Product Liability Act.3 Before the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was enacted in the
revised South Korean Product Liability Act, the ex–Act4 could not regulate

1

Hadogeubgeorae Gongjeonghwae Kwanhan Beobryul [Fair Transaction in Subcontracting Act], Act No.
3779, Dec. 31, 1984, partially amended by Act No. 14143, Mar. 29, 2016, art. 25–3 (S. Kor.);
Gaeinjeongbo Bohobeob [Personal Information Protection Act], Act No. 10465, Mar. 29, 2011, partially
amended by Act No. 14107, Mar. 29, 2016, art 39 (S. Kor.); Daerijeomgeoraeui Gongjeonghwae Gwanhan
Beobryul [Fair Agency Transaction Act], Act No. 13614, Dec. 22, 2015, new enactment, art. 34 (S. Kor.);
Sinyongjeongboui Iyong Mit Bohoe Gwanhan Beobryul [Credit Information Use and Protection Act], Act
No. 4866, Jan. 5, 1995, partially amended by Act No. 14823, Apr. 18, 2017, art. 43 (S. Kor.);
Jeongbotongsinmang Iyongchokjin Mit Jeongboboho Deunge Gwanhan Beobryul [Act on Promotion of
Information and Communications Network Utilization and Information Protection, etc.], Act No. 3848,
May. 12, 1986, partially amended by Act No. 14080, Mar. 22, 2016, art. 32 (S. Kor.); Giganje Mit
Dansigangeulloja Boho Deunge Gwanhan Beobryul [Act on the Protection, etc. of Fixed–Term and Part–
Time Workers], Act No. 8074, Dec. 21, 2006, partially amended by Act No. 12469, Mar. 18, 2014, art. 13
(S. Kor.).
2
See e.g., Yong–Seok Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Kwanhan Mikookeu Choikeun Donghyang
[Punitive Damages in USA torts system], Jaesanbeobyeongoo Je23Kwon Je1Ho [PROP. L. REV. vol. 23–1]
247, 270–72 (2006) (S. Kor.); Se–il Ko, Daeryukbeobeseo Jinbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Noneu [Discussions
of Punitive Damages in the Civil Law Countries – A perspective of Civil Law –], Beobjo Je688Ho [LAW.
ASS’N J. vol. 688] 142, 180–83 (2014) (S. Kor.); Tae–Sun Kim, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjaedoe
Daehan Gochal – Minbeobgaejeonge Ddareun Doipnoneuwa Gwanryeonhayeo [A Study on Punitive
Damages: Introducing punitive damages into Korean Law], Minsabeobhak Je50Kwon [KOR. J. CIVIL L.
vol. 50] 235, 268–70 (2010) (S. Kor.). But see e.g., Seok–Chan Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange
Kwanhan Sogo; Dokilbeobchegyeoeu Kwanjeomeseo [The Liability of Punitive Damages; based on the
German Legal System], Jaesanbeobyeongoo Je29Kwon Je4Ho [PROP. L. REV. vol. 29–4] 141, 152–53
(2013) (S. Kor.); Jong–Goo Lee 1, Mikookeseoui Volkswagenui Jadongcha Baegigas Sagisosongkwa
Sisajeom [Vol[k]swagen’s Diesel Emission Cheating Litigation in the U.S. and its Impolication], Hankook
Kieup beobhakhoe Je30Kwon Je3Ho [BUS. L. REV. vol. 30–3] 271, 294–95 (2016) (S. Kor.); Jae–Ok
Chang & Eun–Ok Lee, Jingbeiljeok Sonhaebaesang Gaenyeomeu Sooyoungganeungseong [Acceptability
of Concept of Punitive Damages], Beobhaknonmoonjip Je39Jip Je3Ho [CHUNG–ANG J. LEGAL STUD. vol.
39–3] 81, 109–10 (S. Kor.).
3
Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], Act No. 6109, Jan. 12, 2000, amended by Act. No.
14764, Apr. 18, 2017 (S. Kor.).
4
Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], Act No. 6109, Jan. 12, 2000, amended by Act. No.
11813, May. 22, 2013 (S. Kor.).
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manufacturers’ outrageous or malicious misconducts properly. For example, when a
manufacturer maliciously causes consumers to get injured, the manufacturer just provides
injured consumers with compensatory damages.5 Considering the result of the example,
the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages could be expected as a proper regulation for
protecting South Korean consumers in product liability actions.
As the doctrine of punitive damages is enacted in the revised Product Liability
Act,6 the apparent legal purpose of regulating malicious manufacturers’ wrongdoing will
be solved by the revised Act. However, there is a legal question regarding whether the
revised Product Liability Act might protect right of a consumer because the adopted
punitive damages award into the revised Act is restricted to three times of compensatory
damages. Compared with the U.S. punitive damages, South Korean punitive damages
might be less effective than the U.S. ones. The restricted punitive damages of South
Korea could not function as the original meaning of the U.S. punitive damages. The
restricted punitive damages award has a less influence on outrageous or malicious
wrongdoing. Due to the possibility of a huge amount of punitive damages awards, the
punitive damages could become effective.
Before the revised Product Liability Act is enforced, there is necessary of
reviewing the revised Act with the U.S. dispute over product liability including punitive
damages to improve effectiveness of South Korean punitive damages in the revised Act
for protecting right of a consumer. With the perspective of comparative law, there are two
main categories about punitive damages between the United States and South Korea. The

5

Id.; Minbeob [Civil Act], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act. No. 13125, Feb. 3, 2015, art. 750,
art. 393, 750, and 763. (S. Kor.).
6
Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, art. 3 (art. 3 and art. 3–2 were amended in
Apr. 18, 2017 and the Act will be enforced in Apr. 19, 2018).
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first category is compatibility between product liability and punitive damages. The
second is applicability of punitive damages to product liability. After that studying the
relation between effectiveness of South Korean punitive damages and restriction of the
punitive damages award is for improving right of a consumer.
Considering the revised South Korean Product Liability Act and its influence,
there are several legal issues in detail: (1) While the doctrine of punitive damages has
been developed by the U.S. common law legal system, South Korean Civil Act is
established not by the common law, but by the continental law system; (2) When the U.S.
courts assess an award of punitive damages against a wrongdoer, the wrongdoer could
possibly become bankruptcy because of a huge amount of punitive damages. Therefore,
establishing the optimal level of punitive damages is needed for achieving the purpose of
punitive damages; (3) Since product liability actions are generally related to the theory of
strict liability, the doctrine which regards wrongdoer’s subjective intention as an
important factor for imposing punitive damages on him or her would not be mingled with
the product liability. Furthermore, there is a dispute over whether the imposition of
punitive damages could be regarded as an object of warranty action in product liability
litigation because the doctrine is familiar with torts rather than contracts; (4) Since the
doctrine of punitive damages has several functions such as punishment, deterrence, law
enforcement, and compensation, considering the influence of these functions on product
liability litigation in South Korea is also necessary; and (5) reviewing the U.S. standard
for product liability including punitive damages by comparative analysis of law helps the
revised Act to improve effectiveness of punitive damages for protecting right of a
consumer as well as to regulate malicious manufacturers effectively.

3

II.

INTRODUCTION OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES INTO SOUTH KOREA
A.

U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
i.

ORIGIN OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages, which are called as exemplary damages or vindictive damages,
or “smart money”, are thought to have originated in the English common law legal
system for regulating outrageous misconducts that government officers commit by
abusing their authority.7 The doctrine of punitive damages in the English common law
legal system was articulated by the English courts.8 In 1760’s aggravating cases, the
court awarded punitive damages, which were determined by juries, to those who caused
outrageous misconducts.9 At that time, the punitive damages formulated by the English
courts played a role as compensating for plaintiffs’ intangible damages and as punishing
defendants’ outrageous misconducts because the concept of actual damages did not cover
intangible damages.10 However, throughout the 19th century, since the attitude of the
English and the U.S. courts over punitive damages had gradually begun to regard
intangible damages as actual damages, after all punitive damages did not play a role as
compensation for intangible damages anymore.11
In 1784, the U.S. court firstly mentioned punitive damages in the case about the

7

Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (C.P. 1763); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, & DAVID F.
PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE, AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 572 (13th ed. 2015); David
G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1263 (1975); Michael
Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1269, 1290–1291 (1993).
8
Id.
9
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 (1957); SCHWARTZ, KELLY, &
PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572; Owen, supra note 7, at 1262, 1263.
10
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519.
11
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 520; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church, 32 Cal. 2d 791,
801 (1948); Motor Equipment Co. v. McLaughlin, 156 Kan. 258, 274 (1943).
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defendant’s practical joke12 and in 1851, Supreme Court of the U.S. accepted the
doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of law.13 When punitive damages were adopted
into the U.S. legal system, an emphasized role of punitive damages was mainly to
compensate for defendants’ mental anguish, personal indignity, and disgrace.14 This is
because, at that time, intangible damages were not included in actual damages.15 With
the double purposes of punitive damages, compensation and punishment, the early U.S.
punitive damages was developed. Due to the double purposes of punitive damages, there
were debates over the validity of the doctrine between the legal formalism and the legal
realism.16 The legal formulism, which sharply distinguished between civil and criminal
process, thought of punitive damages as a usurpation of the functions of the criminal
law.17 This is because the legal formulism thought that the imposition of punitive
damages by civil process was regarded as a violation of the separation between civil and
criminal process.18 Another reason why the legal formulism denied punitive damages in
the U.S. common law legal system was that admitting punitive damages in the civil
process could violate the rights guaranteed by criminal process.19
Even though the legal formulism logically denied punitive damages as a matter of

12

Owen, supra note 7, at 1262; Genay v. Norris, 1 S.C.L. 6, 7 (C.P. and Gen. Sess. 1784).
Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363 (1851); Owen, supra note 7, at 1263.
14
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519; Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the
Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–20 (1982); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1290–92
(1993); Fay v. Parker 53 N.H. 342, 380–381 (1872).
15
Note, 70 HARV. L. REV. 517, supra note 9, at 519, 520.
16
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298; Owen, supra note 7, at 1263; SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 246 n.2 (16th ed. 1899); THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE
OF DAMAGES ch.16 (9th ed. 1912).
17
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298–1299; Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1425 (1982); Owen, supra note 7, at 1264; Fay v. Parker supra note
14, at 382, 397.
18
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1298–1299; GREENLEAF, supra note 16, at § 253, at 240 n.2; Horwitz,
supra note 17, at 1425.
19
Horwitz, supra note 17, at 1425; Owen, supra note 7, at 1264; Fay v. Parker supra note 14, at 382, 397.
13
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law, those who agreed with adopting punitive damages into the U.S. common law legal
system practically argued that punitive damages served as well–recognized social
functions.20 Not only did the imposition of punitive damages provide plaintiffs hurt by
outrageous misconducts with satisfaction, but it also had a positive influence on the
community.21 This is because the imposition of punitive damages served as an example
to the community for deterring them from committing a similar misconduct.22
The debates over the validity of punitive damages between the legal formalism
and the legal realism was reflected to judicial decisions.23 Even though a few states
restricted the doctrine of punitive damages,24 most states confidently established the
doctrine of punitive damages in the common law legal system.25

ii.

DEFINITION OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Punitive damages are not awarded against the defendant for the plaintiffs’ harm
suffered, but rather for punishing the defendant’s outrageous misconducts, for retribution,
for admonishing the defendant not to let the misconducts happen again, and for deterring
others like the defendant from analogous misconducts in the future.26 The imposition and

20

Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1300; SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 474, at 904.
Owen, supra note 7, at 1263; Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 347, at 687.
22
Id.
23
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; Owen, supra note 7, at 1263.
24
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574 (explaining that Nebraska constitutionally
prohibits punitive damages and that Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Washington allow the
trier of fact to assess punitive damages against the defendant only if expressly authorized by statute.);
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1301; O’Reilly v. Curtis Publishing Co., 31F. Supp. 364, 364 (D. Mass.
1940); Burton v. Levitt Stores Corp., 179 A. 185, 186 (N.H. 1935).
25
Owen, supra note 7, at 1263–1264.
26
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1) (Am. Law Inst. 1979) (reporting that “[p]unitive damages are
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future.”); BRYAN A.
GARNER ET AL., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (5th pocket ed. 2016) (explaining that punitive damages
are [d]amages awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice,
or deceit; specif., damages assessed by way of penalizing the wrongdoer or making an example to others.”);
21

6

the determination of the amount of punitive damages are determined by the jury’s
discretion with reflection to consider the character of the defendants’ misconducts, the
nature and extent of the plaintiff’s damages caused by the defendant, and the wealth of
the defendant.27 For example, under the settled rule prevailing in South Carolina, the
jury’s discretion for the imposition and the determination of punitive damages is the duty
as well as the right of the jury to assess punitive damages against the defendants.28
To understand the doctrine of punitive damages, figuring out the purpose of
compensatory and punitive damages as well as distinguishing between the characteristic
of them are necessary. The U.S. judicial system distinguishes between compensatory and
punitive damages, when the plaintiff is damaged by the defendants’ outrageous
misconduct.29 The purpose of compensatory damages30 is to redress the actual damages
caused by the defendants’ misconduct. Punitive damages, on the other hand, are designed
to punish outrageous misconducts for retribution, to deter its similar conducts, and to
compensate for the plaintiff’s excess actual damages.31 Since there are different purposes
between compensatory and punitive damages, the courts separately decide the amount of

SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572; Owen, supra note 7, at 1265; Corbert McClellan,
Exemplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. L. J. 275, 276 (1935); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471,
492–93 (2008).
27
Owen, supra note 7, at 1265–67; Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908, comment d, e;
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; Thomas v. Mickel, 214 Miss. 176,
188 (1952).
28
Owen, supra note 7, at 1265–67; Sample v. Gulf Ref. Co., 183 S.C. 399, 410 (1937). But see SCHWARTZ,
KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 575; Cheatham v. Pohle, 789 N.E.2d 467, 472 (Ind. 2003).
29
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell. 538
U.S. 408, 416 (2003); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001); BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
30
GARNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 209 (explaining that compensatory damages are “[d]amages sufficient
in amount to indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered”).
31
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 574; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell.,
supra note 29, at 416; Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., supra note 29, at 432; BMW of N.
Am. v. Gore, supra note 29, at 568; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, supra note 29, at 19.

7

compensatory and punitive damages.32
With the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment, deterrence, and
retribution, the doctrine of punitive damages mainly served as retribution for the
defendants’ outrageous misconduct during the nineteenth century.33 When the defendant
outrageously sold the defective products to the plaintiff with violating community norms,
as the judges awarded punitive damages to the defendant, the imposition of punitive
damages could achieve retribution for the outrageous misdeed.34 In addition to the
retribution, the doctrine of punitive damages played a critical role in protecting
consumers as the courts expanded the applicability of the doctrine during the early
twentieth century.35 When the plaintiff was damaged by a merchant’s malice, fraud,
insult, reckless, or wanton misconducts during the commercial transactions, the
imposition of punitive damages regulated these merchant’s misconducts.36

iii.

OPTIMAL LEVEL OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

One of the critical disadvantages of the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages is an
unexpected award. Due to the unexpected punitive damages award, decision–makers are

32

Id.
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304; MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 1870–1960 113 (1992).
34
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304; Greene v. Keithley, 86 F.2d 238, 242 (8th Cir. 1936); Luikart v.
Miller, 48 S.W.2d 867, 871 (Mo. 1932); Southern Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Dinsmore, 144 So. 21, 23 (Ala.
1932); Saberton v. Greenwald, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229 (Ohio 1946); Lufty v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor Co.,
115 P.2d 161, 165 (Ariz. 1941); Jones v. West Side Buick Co., 93 S.W.2d 1083, 1099 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936);
Hunt Battery Mfg. Co. v. Stovall, 80 P.2d 623, 624 (Okla. 1938); Hobbs v. Smith, 115 P. 347, 349 (Okla.
1911).
35
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1304.
36
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 7, at 1303; Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co. v. Ross, 170 S.W. 1062. 1064 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1914); Huffman v. Moore, 115 S.E. 634, 635 (S.C. 1923); State Mut. Life & Annuity Ass’n v.
Baldwin, 43 S.E. 262, 264 (Ga. 1903); Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374, 376 (1876); Owen, supra note 7, at
1265–1266.
33

8

worried about the imposition of punitive damages when they consider their company’s
profits.37 Specifically compared with compensatory damages, the amount of punitive
damages is far larger than them.38 The sum of punitive damages depends on the
discretion of the jury, when the trier of fact assesses punitive damages against the
defendant who causes outrageous misconducts.39 Due to the discretion of the jury, the
problem is a proper scope of punitive damages. Since the jury’s feelings and sentiments
have much more influence on the imposition of punitive damages than the award of
compensatory damages, the discretion of the jury about the imposition of punitive
damages is much wider and less credibility than the discretion of assessing compensatory
damages.40
In light of the huge amount of them, when the trier of fact assesses punitive
damages against the wrongdoer, since the due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment hinders the U.S. states from assessing a grossly huge amount of punitive
damages as a punishment against a wrongdoer, the judge has instructed the guideline

37

Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998
WIS. L. REV. 237, 251, 284–86 (1998) (explaining if decision–makers outrageously or maliciously ignored
results of their misconducts for their company’s profits and leaded to negative influence on the society,
injured people could require the amount of punitive damages award of the malicious company,
consequently, the doctrine of punitive damages has influence on behaviors of decision–makers who follow
incentives); see Michael D. Murray, The Great Recession and The Rhetorical Canons of Law and
Economics, 58 LOY. L. REV. 615, 640 (2012).
38
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 572–73; See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging,
Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2003) (upholding the jury’s verdict that the jury assessed $5,000 in
compensatory damages and $186,000 in punitive damages against the defendant); BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (upholding the sum of $ 50,000 in punitive damages since Supreme
Court of the U.S. regarded reduced punitive damages by the appellate court as the violation of due process
rule and denied the appellate court decision that the awards of punitive damages should be reduced from
$ 4,000,000 to $ 2,000,000); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 415–16
(reversing the judgement of Supreme Court of Utah which upheld the sum of $ 145,000,000 in punitive
damages and $ 1,000,000 in compensatory damages).
39
Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908, comment d, e; Note, Exemplary Damages in the
Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; Thomas v. Mickel, supra note 27, at 188.
40
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30; see Thomas v. Mickel, supra
note 27, 188. But see SEDGWICK, supra note 16, at § 474, at 904.
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suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S., which helps the jury to determine how much the
amount of punitive damages is proper.41 The guideline consists of three standards: “(1)
the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the
actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3)
the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”42 Among the three standards, Supreme
Court of the U.S. regards the first standard, the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s misconduct, as the most important standard for measuring the amount of
punitive damages.43 The degree of reprehensibility of defendant’s misconduct is
determined by five determinative factors:
whether: the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the health or safety
of others; the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; the conduct
involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and the harm was the
result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.44
With considering the five determinative factors, Supreme Court of the U.S.
mentioned that “punitive damages should only be awarded if the defendant’s culpability,
after having paid compensatory damages, is so reprehensible as to warrant the imposition
of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.”45

41

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 418;
Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., supra note 29, at 440; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note
29, at 574–75; Restatement (Second) of Torts, supra note 26, at § 908 (2); GARNER ET AL., supra note 26, at 211.
42
Id.
43
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 419; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note
29, at 575–77.
44
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 419.
45
Id.
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The second standard is the ratio between harm and punitive damages. In order to
set the amount of punitive damages properly, the judge considers the “reasonable
relationship” between actual and punitive damages and then the jury shall be instructed
the disparity between compensatory damages and punitive damages.46 Although the
jury’s feeling and sentiment for the imposition of punitive damages are regarded as the
important element to achieve the purpose of punitive damages,47 the judge could modify
the scope of punitive damages by his or her judicial experiences because the judge is well
known about the average of the awards.48 When the judge modifies the amount of
punitive damages assessed by the jury under the “reasonable relationship” rule, the judge
declines to fix the mathematical ratio between compensatory and punitive damages.49
This is because the standard of the fixed mathematical ratio, a bright–line ratio, cannot
reflect all circumstances about the misconduct.50
The disparity between the amount of punitive damages and the “civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases”51 is the third standard for measuring the

46

Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530. But see Developments in the Law –
Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 938–39 (1956) (explaining that since the relation between the amount
of actual and punitive damages focuses not on the admonitory function of tort law, but on the actual results,
the “reasonable relationship” rule cannot achieve the purpose of punitive damages); Jonathan Kagan,
Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment: Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for
Punitive Damages Reform, 40 UCLA L. REV. 753, 757 (1993).
47
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 529–30 (As the trier of fact assesses
punitive damages against the wrongdoer, the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment could be
achieved effectively, and consequently community sentiment could be reflected by the imposition of
punitive damages based on the jury’s feelings and sentiment); See text at note 82–86 infra.
48
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530 (explaining that one of the functions
of punitive damages, the admonitory function of tort law, could be better achieved by the judge than the
jury).
49
Id.; see e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 424–25.
50
Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 9, at 530; Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance
Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 242–43 (1943). But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at
424–25 (mentioning that practically “…few awards exceeding a single–digit ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.”).
51
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, supra note 29, at 428; BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, supra note
29, at 575.
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imposition of punitive damages properly.52 The meaning of the third standard is that if
the imposition of punitive damages, which is processed by the civil procedural, is
substituted for the criminal penalty, the wrongdoer’s constitutional right could be violated
by the imposition of punitive damages.53 This is because the criminal procedure,
compared with civil procedure, promises the heightened protections and the higher
standards of proof for the guilty. Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages does
not automatically serve as the method of regulating outrageous misconducts when there is
a less possibility of imposing criminal sanctions on the wrongdoer.54
The Model Punitive Damages Act hinders short of offering caps on punitive
damages award with various controls on it.55 According to Section 7 of the Model
Punitive Damages Act,56 when the juries shall be instructed by the court, they determine

52

Id.
Id.
54
Id.
55
See Unif. Law Comm’rs, The Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Summary: Punitive
Damages Act, Model (1996),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Punitive%20Damages%20Act,%20Model.
56
Unif. Law Comm’rs’ Model Punitive Damages Act § 7 (approved by the Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs
on Unif. State Laws in July 18, 1996),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Punitive%20Damages%20Act,%20Model,
(a) If a defendant is found liable for punitive damages, a fair and reasonable amount of
damages may be awarded for the purposes stated in Section 5(a)(3). The court shall instruct the
jury in determining what constitutes a fair and reasonable amount of punitive damages to
consider any evidence that has been admitted regarding the following factors:
(1) the nature of defendant’s wrongful conduct and its effect on the claimant and others;
(2) the amount of compensatory damages;
(3) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid by the defendant arising from
the wrongful conduct;
(4) the defendant’s present and future financial condition and the effect of an award on each
condition;
(5) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the wrongful conduct, in excess of that
likely to be divested by this and any other actions against the defendant for compensatory
damages or restitution;
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons;
(7) any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant since the wrongful conduct;
(8) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard promulgated by a governmental
or other generally recognized agency or organization whose function it is to establish standards;
and
(9) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the amount of the award.
53
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a fair and reasonable amount of punitive damages. Among factors described in the
Section 7 (a) of the Model Punitive Damages Act, the first three factors, Section 7 (a)(1),
(2), and (3) are fundamentally identical with the three guidelines mentioned above.57
There is a dispute over Section 7 (a)(4) of the Model Punitive Damages Act. Since each
defendant has their own financial condition and the burden of punitive damages awards
depends on the defendant’s financial condition, the court shall consider its financial
condition for achieving the purpose of punitive damages such as punishment and
deterrence.58 For example, if the trier of fact imposed punitive damages awards on the
defendant regardless of his or her financial condition, a conglomerate would feel less
burdensome than an ordinary corporation. Remaining factors, from Section 7 (a)(5) to
(9), for punitive damages award, also help the juries to assess the amount of punitive
damages against the defendant reasonably.
In addition to the standard suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S. and the Model
Punitive Damages Act, at the U.S. federal or state level, a total amount of punitive

(b) If an award of punitive damages is authorized or governed by another statute of this State,
any requirement as to amount or method of calculation established by that statute governs the
award.
(c) If the amount of punitive damages is decided by the court, the court upon motion of a party
shall make findings showing the basis for the amount awarded against each defendant and enter
its findings in the record.
57
See id. § 7 (a) comment at 19.
58
See text at supra note 27; Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J.
927, 948 (2008). But see Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 269 (explaining that the statute of California, the
U.S. restricts to consider the defendant’s financial condition to protect the defendant from the previous
disclosure of his or her financial position); City of El Monte v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 4th 272, 276
(1994); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3295 (d) (West 2016):
The court shall, on application of any defendant, preclude the admission of evidence of that
defendant’s profits or financial condition until after the trier of fact returns a verdict for
plaintiff awarding actual damages and finds that a defendant is guilty of malice, oppression, or
fraud in accordance with Section 3294. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be
admissible only as to the defendant or defendants found to be liable to the plaintiff and to be
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud. Evidence of profit and financial condition shall be
presented to the same trier of fact that found for the plaintiff and found one or more defendants
guilty of malice, oppression, or fraud.
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damages could be controlled by a cap or a ratio.59 When a trier of fact assesses a punitive
damages award against a malicious wrongdoer within the restriction set by the caps or the
ratio, the trier of fact considers several factors which are determined by a state statute or
its case law.60 While these several factors for the imposition of punitive damages awards
are similar with the standard of Supreme Court of the U.S. and the Model Punitive
Damages Act, article 7 (a), setting the cap or the ratio for limiting punitive damages
awards could weaken the deterrent effect because a liable manufacturer feels less burden
on the limited imposition of punitive damages than on the unlimited the awards. Another
method of controlling punitive damages awards is that a certain percentage of the awards
is paid to the state governmental branch.61 Even though this method does not use the cap

59

See Andrew F. Popper, Capping Incentive, Capping Innovation, Courting Disaster: The Gulf Oil Spill
and Arbitrary Limits on Civil Liability, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 975, 978 (2011) (mentioning that both the U.S.
states and federal government have restricted the amount of punitive damages by establishing caps on civil
liability. While caps of the federal level normally serve as a cap on punitive damages caused by a specific
activity or a particular industry, caps of the state level function as a cap on that except to medical
malpractice); see e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE § 6–1603 (2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60–1903 (2005); LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1231.2 (2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25–9–411 (West 2015);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 32–42–02 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21–3–11 (2016); ALA. CODE § 6–11–21
(LexisNexis 2014). See also e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6604(b)(1) (2012).
60
See SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 589 Notes and Question n. 5; see e.g., Coats v.
Construction & Gen. Laborers Local No. 185, 15 Cal.App.3d 908, 916 (1971) (stating that “the trier of fact
can properly consider the character of the defendant’s act, the nature and extent of the harm to the plaintiff
which the defendant caused or intended to cause, and the wealth of the defendant.”); Atlas Food Sys. and
Svcs., Inc. v. Crane Nat. Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587, 593–94 (4th Cir.1996); Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.2d
291, 293 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925 (2) (2015):
(a) The likelihood at the time that serious harm would arise from the defendant’s misconduct;
(b) The degree of the defendant’s awareness of that likelihood;
(c) The profitability of the defendant’s misconduct;
(d) The duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it;
(e) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
(f) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(g) The total deterrent effect of other punishment imposed upon the defendant as a result of the
misconduct, including, but not limited to, punitive damage awards to persons in situations
similar to the claimant’s and the severity of criminal penalties to which the defendant has been
or may be subjected.
61
SCHWARTZ, KELLY, & PARTLETT, supra note 7, at 575–75; see e.g., Cheatham v. Pohle, supra note 28, at
470; IND. CODE § 34–51–3–6 (2014):
(a) Except as provided in IC 13–25–4–10, when a judgement that includes a punitive damages
award is entered in a civil action, the party against whom the judgement was entered shall pay
the punitive damage award to the clerk of the court where the action is pending.
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or the ratio for restricting the amount of punitive damages awards, the optimal level of
punitive damages awards could be achieved by paying a certain percentage of the award
to the treasurer of state.

B.

SOUTH KOREAN DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
i.

BACKGROUND

The Seoul Eastern District Court in South Korea firstly mentioned the doctrine of
punitive damages when the court dealt with an enforcement of a foreign judgement.62 At
that time, the court did not approve the doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of the
principle of South Korean Civil Act.63 This is because South Korean Civil Act did not
regulate the doctrine of punitive damage and only codified limited compensatory
damages in the torts part.64 After the case mentioned above, Supreme Court of South
Korea still does not regard the doctrine of punitive damages as a matter of the Civil Act
because of the same reasons suggested by the District Court.65 However, according to a
survey conducted by the Seoul Bar Association of South Korea, of 1545 lawyers who
participated in the survey, 1417 agreed to adopt the U.S. punitive damages into the South
Korean legal system, even though there are different opinions about how to enact

(b) Upon receiving the payment described in subsection (a), the clerk of the court shall:
(1) pay the person to whom punitive damages were awarded twenty–five percent (25%) of
the punitive damage award; and
(2) pay the remaining seventy–five percent (75%) of the punitive damage award to the
treasurer of state, who shall deposit the funds into the violent crime victims compensation
fund established by IC 5–2–6.1–40.
62
Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 247; Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], 93Ga–Hap1906, Feb. 10, 1995
(S. Kor.).
63
Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], supra note 62.
64
Id.; Minbeob [Civil Act], supra note 5.
65
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da207747, Jan. 28, 2016 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da1284,
Oct. 15, 2015 (S. Kor.).
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punitive damages.66 In light of the necessity of the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages,
South Korean legislature enacted punitive damages into several special acts of South
Korea in order to regulate malicious misconducts.67

ii.

NECESSITY OF THE U.S. DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Since punitive damages was mentioned by the Seoul Eastern District Court of
South Korea,68 the issue has been whether the doctrine of punitive damages should be
introduced into the South Korean legal system. The opinions supporting the case of the
Seoul Eastern District Court of South Korea are that there is no need to introduce
punitive damages into the South Korean legal system.69 To be specific, since South
Korean Civil Act is based on the continental law legal system, punishing and deterring
malicious misconducts is expected not by the Civil Act, but by the Criminal Act, and thus
the doctrine of punitive damages could not be adopted into the Civil Act.70 Furthermore,
punitive damages could be substituted by consolation money which is codified in South
Korean Civil Act, article 751 and 752.71
In contrast, the doctrine of punitive damages should be adopted into the South

66

Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjaedo Doipe Byeonhosa 91.7% Chanseong [91.7% of Korean Lawyers
Agree with Introduction of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages], Daehanbyeonhyeobsinmoon [News
Koreanbar] (June 20, 2016), http://news.koreanbar.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=14789; Min–Jo
Kim, Punitive damages may become a reality in Korea, About Korean Law (June. 15, 2016),
http://www.aboutkoreanlaw.com/2016/06/punitive-damages-may-become-reality-in.html; Hyeon–Soo Son,
Byeonhosa 10myeong Joong 9myeong, “Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Jaedo Doip Chanseong” [9 of 10
lawyers, “Agree with Introduction of the Doctrine of Punitive Damages”], Beobryulsinmoon [Law Times]
(June 15, 2016), https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/Legal-News/Legal-News-View?serial=101154.
67
See text at supra note 1.
68
Seoul Eastern District Court [Dist. Ct.], supra note 62.
69
Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 271; Se–il, supra note 2, at 183; Tae–Sun, supra note 2, at 269.
70
Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 249, 270; Se–il, supra note 2, at 181; Tae–Sun, supra note 2, at 246.
71
Yong–Seok, supra note 2, at 271–272; Se–il, supra note 2, at 182.
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Korean legal system for preventing malicious conductors.72 There are four reasons. First,
the scope of compensatory damages is limited.73 Even though consumers who severely
injured by a manufacturer get compensatory damages, the amount of compensatory
damages might not be enough to recover their damages because the compensatory
damages are restricted by the defendant’s responsibility in the South Korean Civil
system.74 Therefore, malicious wrongdoers have frequently made bad use of the
limitation of compensatory damages.75 Second, the idea that punitive damages could be
substituted by the consolation money is not proper to protect injured people because the
scope of consolation money is also limited like compensatory damages.76 Third, if the
doctrine of punitive damages is adopted into the South Korean legal system, the doctrine
will play an important role in a class–action suit because it provides an injured person
with a great motivation for filing a lawsuit against malicious conductors.77 Last, as the
South Korean economic market has been influenced by the U.S. one, South Korean

72

See SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM],
JINGBEOLJEOK BAESANGJAEDO CHANGOJARYO [THE DOCTRINE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LEAFLET] at 43, 63
(2006); Jung–Hwan Yoon, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Gwanhan Yeongoo [A Study on Punitive
Damages], Minsabeobhak Je17Kwon [KOR. J. CIVIL L. vol. 17] 58, 87–88 (1999) (S. Kor.); Jeom–In Lee,
Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangeu Doip Pilyoseonggwa Ganeungseunge Daehan Ilgochal [A Study on
Necessity and Possibility on the Introduction of Punitive Damages], Dongabeobhak Je38Kwon [DONG–A
L. REV. vol. 38] 187, 235–238 (2006) (S. Kor.); Sang–Chan Kim & Choong–Eun Lee, Jingbeoljeok
Sonhaebaesangeu Doipel Wihan Bigyobeobjeok Gochal [Comparative Study for Introduction of the
Punitive Damages System], Beobhakyeongoo Je35Kwon [L. REV. vol. 35] 163, 180 (2009) (S. Kor.);
Deok–Hwan Lee, Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesange Gwanhan Ilgochal [A Study on the Punitive Damages],
Beobhaknonchong Je24Kwon [L. REV. vol. 24–3] 563, 583 (2007) (S. Kor.); Seok–Chan, supra note 2, at
155; Jong–Goo 1, supra note 2, at 295; Jae–Ok & Eun–Ok, supra note 2, at 110; Minsung Kim,
Jingbeoljeok Sonhaebaesang Chaekimron [A Dispute of Liability for Punitive Damages], 49 (Feb. 2013)
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Pusan National University) (on file with Jangjeon-Campus the First Library,
Pusan National Library).
73
Sung–Chun Kim, Jinbeoljeok Sonhaebaesangjedowa Sobijapihaegooje [Punitive Damages and
Consumer Redress], in HANKOOKSOBIJAWON JEONGCHAKYEONGOOBOGOSEO 354–55 [in KOREAN
CONSUMER AGENCY POLITICAL RESEARCH REPORT 347] (2003).
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Jung–Hwan, supra note 72, at 86–87.
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corporation laws have been continuously modified to regulate transactions and
corporations.78 On the contrary, without improving regulations for protecting consumers,
South Korean regulations on the economic market is likely to be unfair for South Korean
consumers. For example, under the same business, when defective products cause
consumers to get hurt, the U.S. consumers’ damages could be recovered by punitive
damages as well as compensatory damages, but South Korean consumers damaged by the
same manufacturer could be compensated by only compensatory damages. Considering
this example, the result is unfair for South Korean consumers. Therefore, introducing the
U.S. doctrine of punitive damages into South Korean legal system is reasonable for
protecting South Korean consumers.

iii.

HOW TO APPLY THE U.S. PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO SOUTH KOREA

As the doctrine of punitive damages was adopted into the South Korean legal
system to regulate modern torts effectively, another issue is how to apply the doctrine of
punitive damages to the South Korean legal system. To be specific, the issue is whether
South Korean Civil Act could include the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages as a matter
of law. If not, South Korean policymakers might consider which special acts need to
adopt the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages to regulate malicious misconducts.
The first method is that South Korean Civil Act should be revised to directly
introduce the doctrine of punitive damages into the Civil Act.79 This is because South

78

SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM],
supra note 72, at 61–62.
79
Jung–Hwan, supra note 72, at 87–88; Jeom–In, supra note 72, at 235–238; Sang–Chan & Choong–Eun,
supra note 72, at 180; Deok–Hwan, supra note 72, at 583.
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Korean Civil Act codified limited compensatory damages.80 The second method is that
South Korean legislature refers to the U.S. Model of Punitive Damages Act and
independently enacts Punitive Damages Act which is distinguished from the Civil Act.81
If South Korean legislature enacts the Punitive Damages Act, the Act will be able to
regulate malicious misconducts effectively.82 This means that Punitive Damages Act can
include various types of liabilities caused by malicious misconducts and can codify
exceptions against general rules of the Civil Act.83 The third method is that adopting
punitive damages not into the Civil Act, but into each special act is imperative of
regulating malicious misconducts.84 Considering these three methods, the method of
introducing punitive damages into each special act is much more reasonable than other
methods. The South Korean legal system could be divided into two parts, a general act
and each special act. Each special act serves as an act that regulates touch legal issues
toward social problems and codifies exceptions against the principles of the general act.

III. EXTENDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY
A.

PRODUCT LIABILITY INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
i.

STANDARD OF PRODUCT LIABILITY INCLUDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

The standard of product liability including punitive damages should be
established with the flexible definition of malicious misconducts and the adequate

80

Minbeob [Civil Act], supra note 5.
See text at supra note 55–56. SABEOBJAEDO GAEHYEOK CHOOJIN WIWONHOE [PRESIDENTIAL
COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL REFORM], Jingbeoljeok Baesangjaedo Changojaryo, supra note 72, at 43, 63.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Seok–Chan, supra note 2, at 155; Jong–Goo 1, supra note 2, at 295; Jae–Ok & Eun–Ok, supra note 2, at
110; Minsung Kim, supra note 72, at 38–49.
81
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notice for hindering manufacturers from marketing defective products because of the
different degree of the manufacturer’s responsibility and because of the doctrine’s
quasi–criminal character.85 With the imposition of punitive damages in product
liability actions, the degree of responsibility depends on a manufacturer’s a conscious
and reckless indifference to consumers’ safety related to their dangerous products.86
Additionally, adequate notice by the standard could play an essential role in preventing
manufacturers from marketing ultra–hazardous products because the notice warns
against the marketing of this products with a high possibility of imposing punitive
damages on wrongdoers.87
With judicial experiences, the vague standard of product liability including
punitive damages could be refined and developed.88 This standard is articulated by an
examination of the recurring forms of manufacturers’ wrongdoing, and consequently
the examination about manufacturers’ misconducts could be categorized into five types
of misconducts:
(1) Fraudulent–type misconduct; (2) knowing violations of safety standards; (3)
inadequate testing and manufacturing procedures; (4) failures to warn of known
dangers before marketing; and (5) post–marketing failures to remedy know
dangers.89
In addition to the categorized misconducts, manufacturers grossly intend to

85

Owen, supra note 7, at 1326.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 1326–28, n.333–34 (mentioning various types of reported and unreported cases as well as
additional information gathered on reported cases to articulate and to develop the standard of product
liability including punitive damages).
89
Id. at 1326–29.
86
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abuse their position:
(1) by failing to acquire sufficient product safety information through tests,
inspections or post–marketing safety monitoring; (2) by failing to remedy an
excessively dangerous condition known to exist in a product by altering its
design, adding warnings or instructions, or recalling the product for repair; or
(3) by knowingly misleading the public concerning the product’s safety.90
While those who commit the (3) form of misconduct in a product liability action
naturally deserve to be imposed on a punitive damages award, the (1) and (2) forms of
manufacturers’ misconducts could be regarded as mere negligence.91 Distinguishing
between the (3) form and the others is necessary because the fact of mere negligence is
similar to that of punitive damages in product liability actions.92 There are two
subjective elements for the imposition of punitive damages on a manufacturer: one is the
manufacturer’s awareness of an unnecessary risk of injury culpably and another is that
the manufacturer has to intransigently reject to take safety measures for preventing
dangerous circumstances as well as knows the riskiness of its products.93 These
subjective elements could be determined by several factors which determine whether “a
flagrant indifference to the public safety” is included in the manufacturer’s awareness.94

90

Id. at 1361.
Id. at 1361–62.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 1362, n.495, n.496 (explaining the meaning of the manufacturer’s awareness and of wantonness.
The manufacturer’s awareness is that those who are generally responsible for product safety know its
problems. For example, each member of upper management, the great majority of middle management, and
designated management about concerned problems is regarded as the standard of the its awareness. If the
responsibility were not related to the product safety problems, those who are more directly related to such
matters should be responsible for them. Wantonness is defined as “a realization of the imminence of
damage to others and a restraint from doing what is necessary to prevent the damage because of
indifference to whether it occurs”).
94
Id. at 1368–69.
91
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According to these factors, the trier of fact could properly impose punitive damages on
the manufacturer’s wrongdoing. Several factors include:
(1) the existence and magnitude in the product of a danger to the public; (2) the
cost and feasibility of reducing the danger to an acceptable level; (3) the
manufacturer’s awareness of the danger, of the magnitude of the danger, and of
the availability of a feasible remedy; (4) the nature and duration of, and the
reasons for, the manufacturer’s failure to act appropriately to discover or to
reduce the danger; and (5) the extent to which the manufacturer purposefully
created the danger.95
A plaintiff should prove several facts for the imposition of punitive damages on a
manufacturer in product liability actions. The plaintiff proves the fact that defective
products lead to his or her injury that the manufacturer is aware of the defect, and that
the manufacturer can control the feasibility of preventing the defect from threatening
public safety by taking proper measures.96 However, the plaintiff does not necessarily
demonstrate the manufacturer’s actual awareness of this feasibility. Since the
manufacturer is an expert about their products and its marketing, its awareness would be
presumed.97 Causation in fact is another requirement for the imposition of punitive
damages on the manufacturer committing wrongdoing. There are two causation
requirements, which are that the plaintiff’s injury is “attributable to”98 the

95

Id. at 1369, n.529 (with these factors, the author comments that many considerations for taking a
pertinent measurement of punitive damages award are included).
96
Id. at 1363.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1367 (explaining that the causal correlation of the alleged its misconducts and the injury could be
explained well by the phrase “attributable to” rather than the phrase “caused by” in order to underline that
the U.S. court does not reject the plaintiff’s action in a product liability action including punitive damages
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manufacturer’s defective product: the first causation in fact is whether the
manufacturer’s defective product brings about the plaintiff’s injury and the second is
whether causal correlation of the alleged its misconducts and the injury is a substantial
factor in causing an accident.99
As the standard of product liability including the U.S. doctrine of punitive
damages has been refined and established well by courts of the U.S. and by secondary
resources, outrageous and malicious misconducts can be regulated well by the
doctrine.100 Due to the standard, not only do manufacturers try to maintain and to
develop the quality of their products for public safety, but they are also likely to regard
damages of consumers as their damages.

ii.

ANALYZING THE REVISED PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT OF SOUTH KOREA

South Korean legislature adopted the doctrine of punitive damages into each
special act.101 However, before the U.S. punitive damages were enacted into South
Korean Product Liability Act, since its Civil Act and Product Liability Act could not fully
regulate product liability attributable to malicious misconducts,102 adopting the U.S.

even though the plaintiff has trouble in proving the causation in fact for the imposition of punitive damages
under the strict common–law principles which are applied to compensatory damages).
99
Id. at 1367–68; see MCCORMICK, supra note 113, at § 83. But see e.g., Gill v. Manuel, supra note 68, at
802.
100
Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Motor Vehicles Products Liability Cases,
17 A.L.R. 7th Art. 4 (2016); J. G. Wahlert, Annotation, Constitutional Issues Concerning Punitive
Damages – Supreme Court Cases, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 529 (2005).
101
See text at supra note 1.
102
Jung–Soo Kwak, Why have Korean victims of humidifier disinfectant not received compensation?,
HANKYOREH (May. 11, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/743377.html;
Min–Jo, supra note 145; Dae–Seon Hong, How far will Volkswagen Korea’s emissions scandal go?,
HANKYOREH (July 13, 2016), http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/752206.html;
Young–Jin Oh, Catching VW, THE KOREA TIMES (Aug. 3, 2016),
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2016/11/202_211062 .html.

23

punitive damages into South Korean Product Liability Act was required. For example,
when decision–makers of a manufacturer decide for marketing its products regardless of
defects, they can compare its benefit and compensatory damages caused by its defective
products. If the benefit is larger than compensatory damages, decision–makers are not
reluctant to pay compensatory damages to victims and market the defective products.
Therefore, as the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was introduced into the revised South
Korean Product Liability Act,103 the revised Act helps consumers to be protected by
manufacturers’ malicious misconducts through the imposition of punitive damages.
By revising South Korean Product Liability Act, article 3104 and adding the
article 3–2105 into the revised Act, the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was introduced
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Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, since the revised Product Liability Act is
not yet translated by Ministry of Government Legislation of South Korea, translated Product Liability Act,
articles mentioned in infra note 104–105, 125, and 129 are referred by the prior version of the Act.
104
Id. art. 3 (Product Liability):
(1) A manufacturer is responsible for the person’s life, personal injury, or property loss, except
to the loss over the product itself, which are caused by the manufacturer’s defective product.
(2) In spite of the prior, if a manufacturer, who is aware of defective products, does not take a
proper measure to preventing the injury or loss inflicted upon the person and causes the person
to become severely injured by its defective products, the manufacturer shall be liable to
compensate the injury or property damage to the extent that the amount of compensation does
not exceed three times of inflicting the injury on person or the property loss. A court shall take
the following matters into consideration when it determines the amount of compensation under
this article:
1. The degree of intention;
2. The degree of the damage caused by the manufacturer’s defective product;
3. Economic benefit that the manufacturer gained by supplying its defective product;
4. The degree of the criminal penalty or the administrative disposition, if the manufacturer
is imposed on that because of its defective products;
5. The duration of supplying the defective product and the scale of its supplement;
6. The manufacturer’s financial standing;
7. The degree of the manufacturer’s effort to remedy the injury and loss caused by its
defective product.
(3) If the injured person cannot find the manufacturer of the defective product, those who
market this product to the injured person for benefit are responsible for product liability. But if
the injured person or his or her agency is notified of the manufacturer or another supplier by
whom the defective products was sold, the supplier who benefited from marketing of the
defective product is not liable to product liability.
105
Id. art. 3–2 (Presumption of the Defect etc.) If the injured person proves the following matters, the
causation that the manufacturer’s products had defects when the products were supplied and caused the
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into the revised Act. As the National Assembly of South Korea passed the revised
Product Liability Act in the plenary session, the main expected effects of the revised Act
are the protection of consumers and the improvement of the quality of products made by
South Korean manufacturers and of its competitiveness.106 With the revised South
Korean Product Liability Act, article 3 and added 3–2, analyzing a comparison between
the U.S. legal issue about product liability including punitive damages and the revised
South Korean Product Liability Act helps the revised Act of South Korea to develop itself
and to regulate malicious misconducts.
The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 3 states possibility of the
imposition of punitive damages on a manufacturer who caused the injury or loss inflicted
upon a person. When the South Korean courts assess a punitive damages award against
the manufacturer, because of the Act, article 3, the punitive damages award would be
restricted to the extent that the amount of compensation does not exceed three times of
inflicting the injury on person or property loss. With the restriction of the amount of
punitive damages within three times of compensatory damages, the legal issue is whether
the restriction could achieve two goals, which are the optimal level of punitive damages
and the functions of punitive damages such as punishment and deterrence. South Korean
lawmakers might think that establishing the optimal level of punitive damages through

injury or loss shall be presumed. But if the manufacturer proves that the injury or loss happened not
because of its products, but because of another reason:
1. The fact that the injury or loss happened when the product was used under normal condition;
2. The above injury or loss was caused by the reason that the manufacturer could practically
control in its area;
3. The above injury or loss generally does not happen without the defective product.
106
GONGJEONGGEORAEWIWONHOE [FAIR TRADE COMM’N], "JINGBEOLJEOK SONHAEBAESANGJE" DOIP
DEUNG JEJOMUL CHAEGIMBEOP GAEJEONGAN GUKOE TONGGWA [INTRODUCTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF SOUTH KOREA PASSED THE REVISED PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACT] 2 (2017), http://www.ftc.go.kr/news/ftc/reportView.jsp?report_data_no=7234.
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the restriction of the amount of punitive damages is likely to be essential for controlling
the amount of punitive damages as well as for preventing a manufacturer from being far
more burdensome compared with the manufacturer’s misconduct.
For the imposition of punitive damages on the liable manufacturer in South
Korea, a plaintiff is basically responsible for proving: (1) the product’s defect; (2) the
injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff; and (3) the causation that the product’s defect
lead to the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff hardly proves these
three factors because product liability actions are generally related to professional and
specialized knowledge. Considering the difficulty of proving these facts by the plaintiff,
before South Korean Product Liability Act was revised, the case law established by
Supreme Court of South Korea allow the presumption in the product liability action.107 If
the plaintiff proves the fact that the injury and loss happened when the product was used
under normal condition, the courts of South Korea presume the product’ defect and the
causation between the defect and the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff. As the
case law developed by Supreme Court of South Korea was enacted as the article 3–2 of
the revised South Korean Product Liability Act, the plaintiff’s responsibility for proof can
be relieved.
The added article 3–2 presumes the product defect and its causation if a plaintiff
proves: (1) the fact that the plaintiff’s injury or loss caused by the defective product under
normal condition; (2) the fact that the aforesaid injury or loss happened under the control
of the liable manufacturer or supplier and its area; and (3) the fact that the aforesaid
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See e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2003Da16771, Mar. 12, 2004 (S. Kor.); Supreme Court [S. Ct],
98Da15934, Feb. 25, 2000 (S. Kor.); Jin–Su Yune, Jejomoolchaegimui Juyo Jaengjeom – Choegeunui
Nonuireul Jungsimeuro – [The Main Issues of the Product Liability], Beobhakyeongoo Je21Kwon Je3Ho
[YONSEI L. REV. vol. 21 no. 3] 47–48 (2011) (S. Kor.); Cf., text, at supra note 94–97.
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injury or loss does not happen without the defective product.108 In contrast, for balancing
between the plaintiff and the manufacturer or suppliers, the revised South Korean Product
Liability Act, article 3–2 allows the manufacturer or suppliers to be excused from product
liability by proving the injury or loss inflicted upon the plaintiff was caused by the
plaintiff’s intention over the defect, by the negligence, or any other reasons.
In principle, the courts of South Korea impose compensatory or punitive damages
on a liable manufacturer. However, if an injured person does not know the manufacturer
causes the injury or loss inflicted upon the person, the revised South Korean Product
Liability Act, article 3 (3) basically imposes compensatory or punitive damages on a
supplier regardless of the supplier’s awareness of whether or not the supplier knew or
could know the liable manufacturer.109 As the revised Act extends the scope of the
subject who is responsible for the injury or loss, the plaintiff will be able to be protected
firmly.

B.

COMPATIBILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES WITH PRODUCT LIABILITY
i.

COMPATIBILITY IN THE UNITED STATES

For the imposition of punitive damages in product liability cases, there are two
legal problems. The first is whether the doctrine of punitive damages could be applied to
the strict product liability. While the doctrine has been developed to regulate malicious
misconducts by wrongdoers, the theory of strict liability has been established not by the
wrongdoers’ degree of care, but by products itself. The second is related to warranty

108
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See Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3.
Id. at art. 3 (3).
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actions. As the doctrine of punitive damages could not be applied to contracts, an injured
consumer could not be recovered by the imposition of punitive damages in a warranty
action caused by contracts and product liability.

1.

PRINCIPLE OF STRICT LIABILITY OVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Extending the doctrine of punitive damages to product liability is a complicated
issue, considering the development of the doctrine and the argument of the legal
formulism over it.110 Since the doctrine of punitive damages has been developed for
regulating malicious misconducts,111 there is a dispute regarding whether the doctrine of
punitive damages could be compatible with strict liability in the field of products liability
litigation.112 In light of the requirement of defendant’s fault, the incompatibility
argument over the dispute seems to be reasonable because those who agree the
incompatibility argument thought that the strict liability is determined not by the
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1267–68, n.41 (explaining that “the most frequently cited purported flaws in the
doctrine” of punitive damages are that: (1) punitive damages are anomalous; (2) imposing punitive
damages on the wrongdoer without the criminal procedural safeguards could be unconstitutional because
they are originated from a criminal fine; (3) there is possibility that the plaintiff would benefit from a huge
amount of punitive damages because they are not regarded as compensatory damages; (4) without specific
standards for assessing punitive damages against the wrongdoer, there is possibility that the defendant
should bear over assessed punitive damages award). See text at supra note 17–19 (explaining the attitude of
the legal formulism over the doctrine of punitive damages is against assessing punitive damages award for
regulating misconducts); see also Kagan, supra note 46, at 779–80 (introducing the opinion about the
abolition of punitive damages, which argues that the problems are caused by the huge amount of punitive
damages and reputing that opinion).
111
See text at supra note 26.
112
Compare Owen, supra note 7, at 1269–71, with Donald M. Haskell, The Aircraft Manufacturer’s
Liability for Design and Punitive Damages – The Insurance Policy and the Public Policy, 40 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 595, 620 (1974) (concerning whether the doctrine of punitive damages could be applied to the act
related to mere proof that a defendant manufactures and distributes defective products because the doctrine
of punitive damages is construed as the legal tool for regulating reprehensible misconducts), and Forrest L.
Tozer, Punitive Damages and Product Liability, 39 INS. COUNSEL J. 300, 301(1972) (asserting “[s]trict
liability and punitive damages will not mix. In strict liability[,] the character of the defendants’ act is of no
consequence; in the punitive damages claim the character of the act is paramount.”), and David A.
Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 315 (1969) (arguing that
exemplary damages cannot be allowed for mere negligence unless a specific statue permit to assess the
damages against a wrongdoer).
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defendant’s degree of care, but by the product and its defectiveness.113
However, those who agree with the dispute over the compatibility point out that
the incompatibility argument misunderstands the notion of fault in strict liability.114 The
theory of strict liability developed the notion of fault by including the product and its
defectiveness into the legal consequence fault regardless of the manufacture’s fault rather
than by giving up the degree of care exercised by the manufacture.115 Another
compatibility argument is that the incompatibility argument relies invalidly on the
assumption that punitive damages should be awarded by the identical facts for
compensatory damages based on the underlying theory of its liability.116 When the court
considered imposing punitive damages on the defendant due to the trespass, the court
decided that: “[W]hether exemplary damages should or should not be given does not
depend on the form of action so much as upon the extent and nature of the injury done
and the manner in which it was inflicted, whether by negligence, wantonness, or with or
without malice.”117
In addition to the two logical reasons mentioned above, the U.S. courts has
thought of a punitive damages award as a cause of action based on the principles of strict
liability in many cases such as nuisance, trespass to land and liability for ultra–hazardous
activities, negligence per se, defamation, and implied warranty in the sale of drugs.118
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1268–69; Haskell, supra note 112, at 620; Tozer, supra note 112, at 301; Rice,
supra note 112, at 315.
114
Owen, supra note 7, at 1268–71.
115
Id. at 1269.
116
Id. see Gill v. Manuel, 488 F.2D 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1973) (stating that “[a]n award of compensatory
damages is not a prerequisite to an award of punitive damages.”)
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1269–71; Fleet v. Hollenkemp, 52 Ky. 219, 225–26 (1852). See Drake v.
Wham–O Manufacturing Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974) (explaining that a claim for punitive
damages is not part of the claim itself).
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1270–71; see Nevada Cement Co. v. Lemler, 89 Nev. 447, 450–53 (1973); Milford
v. Tidwell, 276 Ala. 110, 113–14 (1963); Lueck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 111 Ariz. 560, 570–71 (1975);
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Considering the notion of fault in product liability and the invalid assumption established
by the incompatibility argument, prohibiting punitive damages in product liability is
unreasonable.119

2.

WARRANTY ACTIONS FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS

Since cases about product liability in the sale of drugs and defective products
related to physical harms sometimes happen after buying defective products for so long,
injured consumers cannot bring an action because of a shorter tort statute of limitations or
procedural bar except for warranty. Even though injured consumers barely bring an
action in warranty, they may not require punitive damages because warranty actions are
generally derived from contracts and because the imposition of punitive damages is not
allowed in litigation about solely contract.120 The Restatement of Contract(second) § 355
explains that the doctrine of punitive damages is applied to a breach of contract only if
the breach of contract is also regarded as a tort. Considering the Restatement of
Contract(second) § 355, if a warranty action in product liability is related to a tort and an
injured consumer proves malicious misconducts about defective products, he or she can
argue the imposition of punitive damages even in the warranty action.
As warranty actions in product liability litigation are generally regulated by
Uniform Commercial Code § 2–313, § 2–314, and § 2–315, the problem is the
interruption of Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305.121 The official comments of

Reynolds v. Pegler, 123 F. Supp. 36, 38–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Fleet v. Hollenkemp, supra note 69, at 225–
26.
119
Owen, supra note 7, at 1271.
120
Michael Carlton Garrett, Allowance of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Claims, 6 GA. L. REV.
613, 627 (1972). See the Restatement of contract(second) § 355.
121
Owen, supra note 7, at 1275.
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Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305 (a) explains that one of the propositions of § 1–305
(a) is “to make it clear that compensatory damages are limited to compensation.” In light
of the official comment of this subsection (a), Uniform Commercial Code § 1–305 (a) is
likely to hinder the imposition of punitive damages for product liability. However, the §
1–305 (a) could be interpreted such that there is the possibility of recovering punitive
damages for breach of warranty by a specifically provided section in Uniform
Commercial Code or by other rule of law.122 In addition to the interpretation of the
section, as manufacturers’ activity that they maliciously ignore product safety causes
consumers to get physical or mental damages, their activity could be regarded as a
tortious conduct regulated by the “other rule of law”.123
With the interpretation of the Restatement of Contract and the Uniform
Commercial Code, even though warranty actions are derived from the contract and the
doctrine of punitive damages could not be applied to issues about contract, the product
liability case combined with warranty and tortious conducts could be regulated by the
doctrine of punitive damages.

ii.

COMPATIBILITY IN SOUTH KOREA

The purpose of comparative analysis between the U.S. and South Korea legal
issue about punitive damages and their compatibility of product liability is to study the
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. While the theory of product liability is
established by strict liability, the doctrine of punitive damages is based on a wrongdoer’s
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1275–76; John A. Jr. Parkins, Punitive Damages for Wrongful Dishonor of a
Check, 28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357, 360 (1971).
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Owen, supra note 7, at 1277.
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misconduct.124 The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 2 (2) explains the
meaning of “defect.”125 A manufacturer’s misconduct in the article 2 (2)(a) is regarded
as strict liability but the misconduct violating the article (2)(b) and (c) is considered as
negligence per se.126 According to the revised South Korean Product Liability Act,
article 2 (2)(a), if “defect in manufacturing” brings about the injury or loss inflicted upon
the consumer, the manufacturer shall be responsible for product liability regardless of the
manufacturer’s negligence. Therefore, the U.S. dispute over the doctrine and its
compatibility of product liability could be applied to the revised Act of South Korea,
article 2 (2)(a).127
Since the theory of strict liability has been developed by extending the legal
consequence from the degree of care exercised by the manufacturer to the product and its
defectiveness, the doctrine of punitive damages can be theoretically introduced into the
revised South Korean Product Liability Act. Applying the doctrine to the revised Act has
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See text at supra note 26, 112–113.
Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, at art. 2 (2):
(a) The term “defect in manufacturing” means the lack of safety caused by manufacturing or
processing of any product not in conformity with the originally intended design, regardless of
whether the manufacturer faithfully performed the duty of care and diligence with respect to the
manufacturing or processing of the product;
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product would otherwise have been reduced or prevented if an alternative design had been
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(c) The term “defect in indication” refers to cases where damages or risks caused by a product
could have been reduced or avoided if a manufacturer had given reasonable explanation,
instructions, warnings or other indications on the product but he/she fails to do so.
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on a Relief of Responsibility for Proof], Beobhakyeongoo 44 [LAW. REV. vol. 44] 59, 62–63 (2011) (S.
Kor.); Jin–Su, supra note 107 at 1, 18–41; Jong–Goo Lee 2, Jisi, Gyeonggo(pyosi)sangui Gyeolhamgwa
Jejomoolchaegim [Instruction and Warning Defects in the Product Liability Act of Korea], Jeoseutiseu
Je97Ho [JUSTICE L. REV no. 97] 46, 51 (2007) (S. Kor.). See also e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.],
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a positive influence on protecting consumers from misconducts committed by a malicious
manufacturer. On the contrary, product liability caused by “defect in design” of the
revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 2 (2)(b) and “defect in indication” of
the article 2 (2)(c) is based on the standard of care exercised by the manufacturer.128 If
the manufacturer violates the article 2 (2)(b) and (c), the violation of these two types of
product liability consists of negligence per se, and thus the doctrine of punitive damages
can be theoretically compatible with the theory of product liability.
The revised South Korean Product Liability Act, article 7 is about the statute of
limitation.129 If the statute of limitation is expired, the plaintiff cannot bring an action
and require compensatory or punitive damages against the malicious manufacturer. Since
the litigation about product liability such as medical malpractice generally happens after
long periods, the plaintiff’s right of claim for damages normally depends on warranty.
According to the U.S. legal issue and implication about the warranty action for a punitive
damages award, the imposition of punitive damages on malicious misconducts is
basically beyond the doctrine of punitive damages because the doctrine is for regulating
torts rather than contracts. But if the legal issue about contracts is mingled with the torts,
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See Jin–Su, supra note 107, at 21–22, 34.
Jaejomool Chaekimbeob [Product Liability Act], supra note 3, at art. 7:
(1) The right of claim for damages under this Act shall be extinguished by the completion of
prescription if the injured person or his/her legal representative does not exercise his/her rights
within three years from the date on which the injured person or his/her legal representative
becomes aware of both of the following facts:
(a) Damages;
(b) The person liable for the damages pursuant to Article 3
(2) The right of claim for damages under this Act shall be exercised within 10 years from the
date on which the manufacturer supplied the product which caused the relevant damages:
Provided, That with respect to damages caused by any substances which are accumulated in the
body and, in turn, hurt the relevant person’s health, or any other damages the symptoms of
which appear after a lapse of a certain latent period, the aforesaid period shall be reckoned from
the date on which the damage occurs actually.
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the doctrine of punitive damages can be exceptionally applied to this issue. Considering
the conflictual relations between the statute of limitation and the doctrine of punitive
damages in the warranty action for product liability including a punitive damages award,
the U.S. issue and its implication for warranty actions help the revised South Korean
Product Liability Act to settle the conflictual relations.
According to the revised South Korean Product Liability article 7, the statute of
limitation will run from the plaintiff’s awareness of damages and the liable manufacturer
including suppliers or from the date on which the manufacturer marketed the product
causing the plaintiff’s injury or loss. The statute of limitation based on the plaintiff’s
awareness is that his or her right of claim for compensatory or punitive damages should
be exercised within 3 years,130 whereas another based on the date is that the plaintiff can
exercise his or her claim for that within 10 years. In addition to two types of statute of
limitation, the Act provides an exception about them. The exception is about personal
damages which are caused by any accumulated substances in body or about any other
damages that the symptoms of damages could be discovered after a lapse of a certain
latent period.131 The statute of limitation over the exceptional conditions will run from
the occurrence of these damages actually.132 As the Act extends the period of statute of
limitation over the above exceptional circumstances, the injured plaintiff can bring an
action for a punitive damages award within the extended statute of limitation. However,
since the plaintiff’s right of claim for damages which are not included in the statute of
limitation and exceptional conditions mentioned above should depend on the warranty,
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Id.
Id.
Id.
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the U.S. legal issues over the doctrine of punitive damages and its compatibility of the
theory of product liability in warranty action133 can be discussed in South Korea for the
revised Product Liability Act. Since the cases of product liability including malicious
misconducts in South Korea also consist of contracts and torts like the U.S. warranty
actions,134 the U.S. legal issue and implication for the doctrine and its compatibility of
product liability can be applied to South Korean Product Liability Act, and consequently
consumers in South Korea will be firmly protected by the revised Product Liability Act as
well as the U.S. legal issue and its implication of a punitive damages award in warranty
actions.

C.

FUNCTIONS AND THEIR APPLICABILITY TO PRODUCT LIABILITY
i.

FUNCTIONS AND APPLICATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Considering the definition and concept of the doctrine of punitive damages
defined by primary and secondary materials,135 the functions of the doctrine could be
divided into the prominent and less prominent functions.136 To specify the functions of it,
the prominent functions are for punishing the defendant’s outrageous misconducts with
retribution and for deterring similar misconducts in the future.137 The less prominent
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at 572; Cheatham v. Pohle, supra note 28, at 471. Owen, supra note 7, at 1265; Corbert McClellan, supra
note 26, at 276 (1935); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, supra note 26, at 492–93.
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functions are for stimulating private persons to enforce the rules of law and for
reimbursing the plaintiff’s excess of actual damages such as substantial legal fees.138

1.

PUNISHMENT AND RETRIBUTION

One of the most prominent functions is to punish the defendant who outrageously
or maliciously injured the plaintiff.139 As the courts impose punitive damages on the
defendant because of the outrageous misconducts, the punishment of them leads to the
individual satisfaction of the plaintiff, the maintenance of public peace, and the positive
influence indirectly on the law–abider.140 Most of all, the individual satisfaction of the
plaintiff by the imposition of punitive damages gives a pleasure of vengeance to the
injured defendant.141 This is because one of the objectives of tort law is that the court let
the plaintiff give up self–help through the satisfactory legal procedure and punishment.142
Rationally, allowing the injured to give any chance of private revenge against the
wrongdoer is hardly justified in a modern legal system.143 However, in light of the
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plaintiff’s emotional equilibrium and the objectives of tort law,144 the function of the
punishment and retribution brings about a positive result in the community.145
The maintenance of public peace is preserved by the imposition of punitive
damages.146 This means that since an injured person is satisfied with the court’s decision
assessing punitive damages against the outrageous wrongdoer, the imposition of punitive
damages prevents the person with doing self–help for revenge and with dueling between
the parties, and consequently it plays an important role in inducing individual vengeance
to the courtroom.147 Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages protects social
moral and legal standards.148 When wrongdoers make a member of society be damaged
with the outrageous or malicious intent, the court should decide to punish outrageous
misconducts in order to maintain public peace and to rebuild the society’s emotional
equilibrium.149
The punishment of the wrongdoer who causes the plaintiff to get hurt has a
positive influence on indirectly the law–abider.150 As the wrongdoer was punished by
punitive damages, not only does the law–abider confidently observe social moral and
legal standards, but he or she regards them as the fairness of the judicial system.151 In
addition to the positive influence on the law–abider, the punishment of the wrongdoer by
punitive damages brings about a positive result that he or she could learn and absorb
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society’s legal value and gives him or her the chance of atoning for his or her
misconducts.152
The most common cause of product liability is categorized into three factors: the
manufacturing defect, the design defect, and the warning defect by manufacturers’ minor
misconducts.153 As each common causation is regarded as a mere error in the product
liability action, the court does not need to consider the doctrine of punitive damages for
punishment and retribution.154 However, if a manufacturer knowingly or recklessly
ignores the defective product and causes consumers to get injured, the manufacturer’s
malicious misconduct would be punished with the imposition of punitive damages. As
the court imposes punitive damages on the manufacturer for punishing the outrageous
misconducts, the injured consumers’ emotion of helplessness over the manufacturer’s
malicious misconducts could be tempered with the award of punitive damages and the
imposition of punitive damages deprives the manufacturer of their benefit produced by its
outrageous misconducts.155 Additionally, the imposition of punitive damages on the
manufacturer’s malicious misconducts reflects the public’s criticism and emphasizes the
manufacturer’s responsibility toward consumers’ safety.156
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2.

DETERRENCE

The deterrence is also regarded as one of the most important functions of punitive
damages with punishment.157 The definition of deterrence is the process of discouraging
a wrongdoer and members of the social community from committing misconducts by fear
of punishment.158 With the definition of deterrence and the concept of the doctrine of
punitive damages, the deterrence is divided into the general and specific deterrence.159
While the specific deterrence is for preventing the wrongdoer from engaging in similar
misconducts again in the future, the general deterrence is for prohibiting the members of
the social community from having the similar misconducts in the future.160
With the general deterrent effect, the U.S. courts have followed the “reasonable
relationship” rule, which is based on the comparison between actual harm and the amount
of punitive damages. The courts do not set up the specific formula for the proper
deterrence under the “reasonable relationship” rule. In contrast, the theory of deterrence
criticizes the attitude of the U.S. courts over the general deterrent effect. The theory of
deterrence is about “the elaboration of the effect on rational actors of the possible
imposition of sanctions for violations of law.”161 The theory explains that the proper
deterrence could be achieved by the effort of establishing the specific formula for the
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“reasonable relationship” rule.162 The rule and the vague standard for it bring about
either inadequate or excessive deterrence163 because the “reasonable relationship” is
determined by the judge’s discretion.164 In addition to the specific formula for the
“reasonable relationship” rule, the possibility of escaping liability should be regarded as
an important factor to achieve the effect of deterrence properly.165 The proper effect of
the deterrence is related to the optimal level of punitive damages. Since establishing the
optimal punitive damages depends on whether the misconducts are certainly revealed or
not, the trier of fact separately considers the possibility of escaping liability and the
liability with certainty when the amount of punitive damages is determined for deterring
the misconducts.166
In product liability actions, the prediction of the imposition of punitive damages
on malicious misconducts is rarely possible for a manufacturer because a manufacturer
cannot accurately predict how many consumers get injured by a defective product,167
although there are the “reasonable relationship” rule suggested by the U.S. court and the
theory of specific formula for proper deterrence. Due to the unpredictability of the
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amount of punitive damages in the product liability action, the deterrent effect by
punitive damages could be achieved by the imposition of them on manufacturers
producing ultra–hazardous products for their benefit regardless of consumers’ injuries
and compensatory damages for consumers’ actual damages.168

3.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COMPENSATION OVER ACTUAL DAMAGES

The functions of punitive damages as law enforcement and compensation for
excess of actual damages are relatively less important than the prominent functions such
as punishment and deterrence. However, the less important functions also play a role as
useful legal tools. Most of all, the function of the law enforcement has a positive
influence on the community as punitive damages serve as “a kind of bounty” which leads
the injured plaintiff to bring an action against the wrongdoer.169 In light of the bounty,
the imposition of punitive damages serve as a reward “for his public service in bringing
the wrongdoer to account,” and it contributes to the community as the trier of fact
assesses punitive damages against the wrongdoer’s misconduct which is “beyond the
reach of the criminal law and the public prosecutor.”
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Another less important function

is the compensation for excess of actual damages.171 To specify it, since the “American
rule” does not allow attorneys to receive awards of attorneys’ fees without the statutory
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authorization, punitive damages function as the payment of litigation expenses for the
plaintiff.172
In product liability actions, the imposition of punitive damages helps injured
consumers to pay for attorney’s fees and costs of preparing for the product liability
action173 as well as functions as law enforcement for punishing and deterring malicious
misconducts by a manufacturer. Compared with another type of action, the action for
product liability requires more professional knowledge because discovering and proving
defective parts of the product are not easy for consumers, and thus they should hire
experts about the defective product.174 This additional expense for the product liability
action is burdensome to the plaintiff who is an injured consumer.175 However, as the
U.S. courts impose an award of punitive damages on the wrongdoer marketing defective
products intentionally, the injured consumers could become less burdensome about
paying additional money for discovery and proof of the defective parts of the product.176

4.

POSSIBILITY OF BLUNTING THE FUNCTIONAL EFFECTS

The expected effects resulting from functions of the doctrine of punitive damages
could be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages on outrageous wrongdoers in
product liability actions. As an award of punitive damages becomes burdensome to
manufacturers, they try to investigate their products for consumers’ safety and to find
their defective products. However, a problem is product liability insurance about punitive
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damages. Due to the liability insurance, there is a debate over whether the effect of the
doctrine’s functions could decrease or not.177 The first opinion is that the liability
insurance’s influence on product liability actions could hinder the doctrine of punitive
damages from achieving their prime purpose in these actions.178 This means that as a
manufacturer committing wrongdoing to consumers takes up an insurance policy for
preserving its benefit from the imposition of punitive damages caused by its malicious
misconducts, the functions of the doctrine could become less effective.179 On the
contrary, another opinion criticizes the first opinion and argues that the liability insurance
has a less negative influence on the doctrine’s functions.180 Research found that the
insurance problem makes manufacturers work out a way, such as “risk control
techniques,” to improve their products’ safety and quality.181 In addition to the
improvement of safety and quality, due to deductible provisions in the liability insurance,
manufacturers cannot help taking care of the insurance problems, if their coverage for
liability insurance could not decrease.182 According to the study report of the U.S.
Bureau of Domestic Commerce, since some manufacturers could not take out an
insurance policy for product liability because of the decline of insurance partially or
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entirely by insurers, they give up marketing risky products.183 In light of the policy of
insurers, the functions of the doctrine of punitive damages are not undermined by the
insurance problems about product liability actions because the insurers will decline the
insurance for the manufacturer committing malicious wrongdoing. Therefore, the
manufacturer should be responsible for the product liability including punitive damages
regardless of insurance problems.

ii.

FUNCTIONS AND APPLICATION IN SOUTH KOREAN REVISED PRODUCT
LIABILITY ACT

The U.S. doctrine of punitive damages is introduced into the revised South
Korean Product Liability Act. The reason why the revised South Korean Product
Liability Act adopts the doctrine is directly related to functions of the doctrine of punitive
damages.184 The doctrine of punitive damages functions as punishment, retribution,
deterrence, law enforcement, and compensation for excess of actual damages.185
According to the reference report released by Fair Trade Commission of South Korea, the
main purpose of the revised Act is to deter malicious misconducts committed by a
manufacturer.186 As the revised Act restricts an amount of a punitive damages award
within three times of inflicting the injury or loss upon a plaintiff, the legal issue is
whether the purpose of deterring malicious misconducts could be achieved. Within the
purview of a limited punitive damages award, the imposition of the awards on malicious
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misconducts could become a less effective deterrent for manufacturers or suppliers.187
This is because the limited punitive damages are hardly distinguished with compensatory
damages. On the contrary, the Fair Trade Commission of South Korea thinks of three
times of inflicting upon a plaintiff’s injury or loss as a proper amount of punitive
damages award. The Commission considers several factors for establishing the
reasonable amount of punitive damages. First, if there is no cap for the punitive damages
award, manufacturers’ activities shall decrease because they are reluctant to invest their
money on developing dangerous products required to install additional safety parts.188
Second, if a legal action for a punitive damages award causes a liable manufacturer or
supplier to become bankruptcy because of the unlimited award, those who do not
participate in this legal action cannot require punitive damages of the bankrupted
manufacturer.189 Therefore, the imposition of punitive damages without the cap brings
about the inequity issue among consumers injured by a liable manufacturer.190 Third,
considering the relation of other special acts of South Korea to Product Liability Act, Fair
Trade Commission of South Korea mentions that the revised South Korean Product
Liability Act adopts the doctrine of punitive damages with the three–times’ cap. This is
because all South Korean special acts adopting punitive damages restrict an amount of
punitive damages award within three times of inflicting of injuries or losses upon the
plaintiff.191
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IV. FUTURE OF SOUTH KOREAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A.

NECESSITY OF IMPROVEMENT OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A legal dispute over effectiveness of punitive damages in the Product Liability

Act of South Korea is whether the essential purpose of protecting consumers from
malicious manufacturers could be achieved by the imposition of punitive damages within
three times of compensatory damages. When the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was
introduced into the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea, lawmakers restricted a
punitive damages award to the three times of compensatory damages.192 According to
Fair Trade Commission, for preventing manufacturers from being bankrupted, the
amount of punitive damages should be limited to the three–times’ cap.193 Moreover,
without exception, the cap of all adopted punitive damages in each special act of South
Korea is limited to three times of compensatory and thus there is possibility that those
who get severely injured by the malicious manufacturer could not be recovered fully
within the three times of compensatory damages.194 Because of concern about
manufacturer’s bankruptcy without sense of responsibility and a uniform limitation about
the imposition of punitive damages, the legal problem caused from the above legal issue
is that effectiveness of the South Korean punitive damages could be weakened.195
To improve effectiveness of punitive damages for guaranteeing right of
consumers, the first method is to reform the South Korean punitive damages by
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reviewing theoretical legal disputes over the doctrine of punitive damages in product
liability. The second is that the manufacturer should have sense of responsibility toward
consumers rather than concern about bankruptcy caused by the imposition of punitive
damages.

B.

REFORMING THE THREE–TIMES’ CAP OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
To maintain the original purpose of punitive damages in the revised Product

Liability Act which is for guaranteeing right of consumers, restricting the amount of
punitive damages uniformly to the three times of compensatory damages is not proper.
The limited amount of punitive damages adopted into several special acts of South Korea
could not fully satisfy a consumer’s damages caused by a malicious manufacturer, if the
consumer is severely injured or loses his or her life by the manufacturer. The courts of
South Korea follow the enacted punitive damages within the three times’ cap and might
impose the punitive damages award against the malicious wrongdoer within two or two
point five times at the most.196 Even though the limited amount of punitive damages can
prevent manufacturers from being bankrupted and cannot discourage them to invest
money on the development of risk products, if the adopted punitive damages of South
Korea is not effective for protecting some consumers who are severely damaged or lose
their life, the punitive damages of South Korea may not become a practical legal tool, but
just a symbol.
There is an implication for reforming punitive damages in South Korea that the
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existed cap should be increased to ten times at the most.197 However, the best way of
guaranteeing the consumer’s right is to abolish the fixed cap of punitive damages when
the consumer is severely injured or loses his or her life. Since South Korean
policymakers and lawmakers considered the guideline for the imposition of punitive
damages suggested by Supreme Court of the U.S.,198 without the cap of punitive
damages, the courts of South Korea can decide punitive damages by the judge’s
discretion.

C.

IMPROVEMENT OF MANUFACTURERS’ RESPONSIBILITY
If manufacturers have sense of responsibility toward their products, policymakers

do not try to establish the doctrine of punitive damages. Improving a manufacturer’s
sense of responsibility is the best method for protecting consumers from malicious
misconducts by manufacturers. For improving the manufacturers’ responsibility, the
revised Act, article 3 (1) regulates that a punitive damages award will be assessed against
all manufacturers.199 A legal issue about the article 3 (1) is whether this article shall have
a negative influence on manufacturers’ activity because all manufacturers are affected by
the punitive damages award.200 However, the revised Act, article (3) restricts the
applicability of the doctrine of punitive damages within the purview of a certain
circumstance that a manufacturer intentionally gives a rise to severely personal damages
by its defective product, and consequently the adopted punitive damages will have less
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negative influence on its marketing than what the manufacturer expect.201 As all
manufacturers are regulated by the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea, not only
will their competitiveness in the domestic and international market be raised, but also
their awareness of public safety will be increased by complying with the Act.202
Moreover, if a manufacturer maliciously and outrageously does not consider the
fundamental right of a consumer and the product is marketed to the consumer without the
manufacturer’s sense of responsibility, the courts of South Korea do not need to take the
possibility of the manufacturer’s bankruptcy into account. If not, the purpose of punitive
damages is never achieved and the essential right of the consumer cannot be guaranteed
by the revised Product Liability Act of South Korea.

V.

CONCLUSION
The U.S. doctrine of punitive damages was finally introduced into the revised

South Korean Product Liability Act. Before the introduction of the U.S. doctrine,
consumers’ personal damages attributable to malicious manufacturers misconducts was
not prevented by the prior South Korean Product Liability Act. Following the South
Korean Civil Act, the U.S. doctrine of punitive damages cannot be allowed to regulate
manufacturers’ misconducts. This is because the prior South Korean Product Liability
Act had been established by the principle of the Civil Act, and thus the South Korean
courts have imposed compensatory damages within the defendant’s responsibility for his
or her misconducts only. Even though the introduction of the U.S. doctrine of punitive
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damages cannot fundamentally settle the legal problem mentioned above because of
confliction between South Korean Civil Act and the U.S. doctrine, the introduction of the
U.S. doctrine is practically required to protect consumers from malicious manufacturers.
Besides, the revised South Korean Product Liability Act adopts the presumption of proof
for consumers. And if consumers cannot know a manufacturer who causes them to be
injured by its defective product, the revised Act shall allow them to bring an action for
punitive damages against a supplier. The revised South Korean Product Liability Act
strongly protects consumers better than before.
Since the cap for limiting punitive damages might hinder effectiveness of the
punitive damages award from deterring malicious misconducts committed by a
manufacturer, reviewing product liability cases caused by malicious misconducts is
necessary. Moreover, a theoretical issue about conflicting the U.S. doctrine of punitive
damages and the principle of South Korean Civil Act is not fundamentally settled. The
introduction of the U.S. doctrine into each special act of South Korea is likely to escape
from this theoretical issue, and thus the principle of South Korean Civil Act cannot be
developed. Henceforth, the U.S. legal principles such as the doctrine of punitive damages
may be continuously introduced into South Korea. Whenever the U.S. legal principles
come into conflict with the principles of South Korean Civil Act, if the U.S. legal
principles are not introduced into the South Korean Civil Act, but into each special act of
South Korea, the ultimate resolution that the principles of South Korean Civil Act can
harmonize with the U.S. legal principles is never achieved. Therefore, policymakers of
South Korea might need to keep studying how the principles of South Korean Civil Act
can mingle with the U.S. legal principles.
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